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1 Introduction
The development of software under open-source licenses has been the subject
of considerable attention among economists in recent years, particularly due
to the unique features of open-source software (OSS) development and its
increasing importance in software markets that were traditionally dominated
by large proprietary sellers. One of the puzzling aspects of OSS development
is its public good nature where individual developers contribute to developing the software but do not hold any copyright on their work and hence
cannot prevent their contributions from being copied, modified or used by
others. In the absence of copyrights, developers cannot appropriate the value
of their innovations. This calls into question the motives behind such effort by
developers.
Beyond ideological or altruistic motivations that may be driving the opensource movement, the literature on OSS has primarily identified two economic
benefits that open source provides to developers. First is a direct user benefit to
developers as they improve the quality of a software program for their own use.
Contributions driven by this motive have public good characteristics since these
improvements can be enjoyed not just by the individual developer, but by all
other users of the software as well. A second benefit is labor market signaling or
reputational benefits from solving programming problems (Lerner and Tirole
2002). This is a private benefit to the programmer and hence is devoid of any
under-provision problem of a public good. Much of the research on OSS has
adopted one or the other explanation for incentives to develop OSS. Johnson
(2002), Harhoff, Henkel, and von Hippel (2003) and Atal and Shankar (2014)
consider OSS as the private provision of a public good where developers begin a
project with the expectation of using the software.1 Other papers such as Blatter
and Niedermayer (2008) and Spiegel (2009) provide a model based on labor
market signaling.
In this paper, we argue that the value of software created by an opensource model depends crucially on the type of incentives governing effort
provision by developers. In particular, effort provision can be more or less
than efficient depending on these incentives. We show that if contributions
are driven by the user value of the software, the benefits of which cannot be
appropriated completely by the developer, then the OSS is characterized by
the classic under-provision of effort in a public good. On the other hand, if

1 The private provision of public goods was modeled in a general setting in Bergstrom, Blume,
and Varian (1986).
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incentives are driven by reputational concerns and ego gratification, then
there is a tendency for developers to over-invest their effort in a race to
innovate. We thus provide an integrated model of developers’ incentives to
describe OSS development.
In our model, different incentives govern effort provision at different stages
of OSS development. Software development usually begins with the initial
conception of the idea and designing the software followed by testing (alpha
and beta testing), ending with a mature or stable release of a final version that is
ideally made available to the general market. Thus, we describe the software
development process in two stages with the first stage being the design stage
followed by commercialization of the software in the second stage. Typically,
one can expect that the incentives for effort provision vary depending on the
phase of software development. In the initial stages, when the idea is being
developed and the preliminary software code is being improved, the reputational or labor market signaling payoff from effort is significant. There are a few
reasons for this. First, the software versions being updated are more visible to
the software community and hence the signals are targeted toward the relevant
labor market for the programmer. Second, the intellectual challenge associated
with developing a new idea is likely to be greater; hence, the ego gratification
payoff from being the first to innovate is large. On the other hand, later stages of
software development are often geared toward making the software more useful
to end-users through documentation, adding usability features to the software,
and other aspects that make it easier to commercialize the software to the
general consumers’ market. Effort provision under these two incentives may
not be optimal; reputational concerns tend to create over-investment in design
effort, while the public good under-provision can produce suboptimal effort
levels in both stages.
This framework allows us to describe the role of the OSS licensing process in
inducing more optimal effort across different stages of software development.
While there is a wide range of open-source licenses each with different terms
under which the software can be modified, combined and distributed, in this
paper we focus on the restrictions placed on the adoption of a proprietary
license by modified works originating from the first open-source license. The
most restrictive license in these terms is the GPL (GNU Public License) that
forces derivative works to adopt the same “open”-licensing terms. At the same
time, there are other less restrictive OSS licenses, such as the BSD (Berkeley
Software Distribution) license, that allow modifications to be released under a
different license, even a proprietary one.
Our analysis yields some interesting predictions about the motivations
driving effort provision among different OSS licenses. First, unlike a
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restrictive license (R) where the final software is freely available to all users,
under a non-restrictive license (NR), which can be made proprietary at a later
stage, developers know that they may have to pay a price to use the final
software in the future. This limits their consumers’ surplus as users and hence
tends to suppress their design effort below the level achieved by an R license
in the first stage. This also implies that unlike an R license where design effort
is driven by both reputational benefits and expected user benefits, effort in
the early stages of the NR license is driven only by reputational concerns. This
makes effort provision under the NR license more sensitive to the size of the
reputational prize as compared to the R license. Thus we find that R licenses
always provide more effort in the design stage relative to NR licenses. This
result speaks to the findings by Colazo and Fang (2009) that restrictive
licenses are associated with more coding activity relative to non-restrictive
ones.
Comparison of the commercialization value generated by the two licenses
is more complex. Due to complementarities in the two stages of software
development, the difference in commercialization effort between the two
types of licenses may go either way. On the one hand, for any given level of
design effort, the public good problem in an R license leads to under-provision of commercial value in the second stage. This does not happen under an
NR license which operates as proprietary software in this stage. At the same
time, if design and commercialization efforts are complementary, higher
design effort may stimulate greater commercialization effort. Since effort in
NR licenses is more sensitive to reputational benefits, when these are large,
design effort under the two licenses is similar, so that the public good
problem in the R license outweighs complementarity effects leading to an
overall reduction in commercial value below that provided by the NR license.
The opposite is true when reputational gains from software development
are small.
In contrast to our finding that R licenses may be more successful than the
NR license in generating the software, much of the empirical research on the
success of OSS has found favor with NR licenses (Comino, Manenti, and Parisi
2007; Subramaniam, Sen, and Nelson 2009). We address this puzzle in our
model by endogenizing the choice of license. By doing so, we find that the
market chooses an NR license when developers’ incentives are driven by reputational concerns. Market selection of NR licenses in the presence of significant
reputational benefits and consequently greater effort provision in this license
then explains, in equilibrium, the finding that NR licenses are more successful in
generating software for users. Further, we find that the NR license dominates the
R license when there are a large number of users of the software. This is
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supported by the finding in Comino, Manenti, and Parisi (2007) that NR licenses
are more likely to be found in software with larger commercial value.
We also describe effort provision and equilibrium licensing choice when a
fully proprietary license is an option. Unlike the OSS licenses, a proprietary
license does not provide reputational benefits to developers; however, it provides more optimal user value relative to effort costs. One interesting result
here is that when the cost of effort provision is too high, the proprietary license
fails to produce the software even though it is socially beneficial, whereas both
OSS licenses produce it. This is in contrast to the result in Johnson (2002)
where he shows that OSS may not generate socially valuable software that a
proprietary production process provides. In terms of licensing choice, we find
that a proprietary license is chosen over an OSS license by the market when
reputational benefits are small but the user population is very large. Lerner
and Tirole (2005) find that non-restrictive licenses dominated OSS that targeted
other software developers while restrictive licenses were more likely to be used
in software geared toward end-users. We believe that the results of our analysis
address this empirical finding since reputational gains are likely to be high
when the target audience is comprised of other knowledgeable software
developers.
Finally, we also provide a welfare analysis of the licensing choice. We find
that an R license is under-provided by the market relative to the efficient level.
Sometimes the market chooses an NR or a proprietary license even when R is
socially optimal. The market’s choice of the license is driven by the surplus to
the developer. Since the software developed by the R license is never commercially sold for a positive price, the market ignores the end-user surplus generated by this license. The resulting positive externality from the R license
provides a case for preferential public policy toward such licenses. We also
find that a proprietary license chosen by the market may sometimes be desirable
from an efficiency point of view. Hence a blanket subsidization of OSS without
regard to the project’s characteristics is suboptimal.
Our paper draws on two streams of research on OSS. First is the literature on
economic incentives for the development of OSS. As mentioned before, much of
the existing literature has either adopted a public good provision model or a
labor market signaling perspective for developers’ incentives. In contrast, we
allow for both incentives and describe the interaction between the two incentives in the OSS development process. Second, we also contribute to the research
on OSS licenses. Literature in this area is less extensive. Gaudeul (2005) examines the choice between GPL and BSD licenses when developers can hijack the
project and sell it for a positive price. The BSD license allows greater effort
provision, but also entails the possibility that the project leader loses some
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profits to developers. Niedermayer (2013) and D’Antoni and Rossi (2007) also
look at licensing choice as a way of balancing out investment incentives across
complementary components of software production as we do here. However,
while they only look at the hold-up of developers’ investment in the software
production process, we look at both the hold-up problem and the potential overinvestment problem from the tournament to win the reputational prize. We
argue that the hold-up of investment may be less severe in some cases because
of the mitigating effect of this over-provision.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
describes effort provision under three kinds of licenses – a proprietary license, a
restrictive OSS license and a non-restrictive OSS license. Section 4 explains the
choice between these three licenses under various conditions. Section 5
describes the welfare maximizing choice of license and compares it to the
equilibrium license. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are provided in Appendix B.

2 The Model
We consider a model with a profit maximizing project leader organizing the
development of a software. There are M > 2 consumers in the population.
N 2 ð1; M Þ of the consumers are also developers who exert effort to develop
the software and then consume the final software product. The remaining
ðM  N Þ consumers are end-users who simply consume the software.
Software development occurs in two stages – Stage 1 or the “Design” stage
where developers invest effort to design and test the software and Stage 2 or the
“Commercialization” stage where developers add user value to the software to
make it commercially usable by the general market.2
The software can be produced under three different kinds of licenses – a
proprietary license (P), a restrictive OSS license (R) or a non-restrictive OSS
license (NR).3 In the P license, the project leader controls effort provision in
every stage of the production process and appropriates all the consumers’
surplus from the software. In an R OSS license, neither the project leader nor
the developers hold the copyright for the value of their effort and the OSS is
provided as a public good. The project leader does not control effort provision in
any stage in a restrictive OSS license. In an NR OSS license, the project leader
does not control the design stage of the software, but she can make the software

2 See Reinganum (1989).
3 Restrictive are also called “copyleft” licenses.
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proprietary during the commercialization stage and appropriate the resulting
consumers’ surplus from the software by charging a positive price.
To provide some real-world context to our model of the production process,
let us think of the project leader as a software platform owner, such as Apple,
Google or a Linux distributor. In the case of Apple, the platform is completely
proprietary as Apple controls both the operating system and the application
development process. On the other hand, Google has adopted a non-restrictive
open-source license (Apache license) for its Android operating system. Thus
while Google does not control the platform itself which is open to all developers,
it does have its own proprietary applications on the platform (such as its search,
maps, mail, etc.). Finally, there are a number of Linux distributors, both commercial (Ubuntu) and community driven (Debian), who use a restrictive opensource license (GPL) and hence allow developers to fully control the platform
and the application development process.
Given these three license choices, the project leader chooses a license for her
project in Stage 0 in a competitive market for projects and “hires” N developers.4
Project leaders, competing to “hire” the best available developers, thus have to
pay their entire profits as an entry wage to attract developers.
Effort by developer i in stage t is eti 2 ½0; 1, where t 2 f1; 2g and i 2 f1; 2;
:::; Ng. The marginal cost of effort for each developer is c > 0.5 We assume that
c < 2M. This ensures that there is a positive probability of the software being
developed.
In Stage 1, there is a stochastic process that determines how effort translates
into design value for each developer in this stage. The design value generated by
i:i:d:

developer i is di ¼ e1i "i ; where "i , U ½0; 2. This means that even if a developer
puts a lot of effort, sometimes the design might not be innovative and successful, or sometimes it might add much more design value than the actual effort
invested. The highest design value generated by developers, denoted by
D ¼ maxfdi ji ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; N g, proceeds to Stage 2 of the software development
process. In Stage 2, developers again exert effort to make the software usable to
the end-user. The commercial value of the software generated in this stage
N
P
is Z ¼ e2i .
i¼1

The total value of the software development process to developer i then
comprises three components given license type L 2 fP; R; NRg and effort levels
4 In reality, a project leader can start a project under, for example, a proprietary license and
then turn it into an OSS license, but we assume away these possibilities in our model.
5 We assume that all developers are identical, hence they have the same utility from the
software and the same cost of effort.
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e1i and e2i . First is the user value, u, from using the end product. We assume a
multiplicative utility function for this value implying that design and commercialization values are complementary to each other, i.e.
u ¼ DZ:
Second, if an OSS license is adopted (R or NR), developers’ contributions in the
design stage provide a potential reputational benefit from making the innovation. However, only the developer who makes the highest value contribution ðdi Þ
receives this benefit. We assume that developers may receive this reputational
benefit only from the design effort and not in the later commercialization stage.6
If the license adopted is proprietary, then developers’ contributions are not
visible since the project leader owns the copyright in all stages of the software
production process and hence there is no reputational benefit to developers from
investing in design effort.7 Thus, we define this reputational prize as SðLÞ, where

S > 0 if L 2 fR; NRg;
S ð LÞ ¼
0 otherwise:
It is worth elaborating on the nature of this reputational prize, S, in our model.
Lerner and Tirole (2002) make a distinction between “career concerns incentive”
and “ego gratification” in what they broadly define as the signaling incentive for
developers to contribute toward OSS. Under the career concerns motive, developers contribute to OSS because it provides them a way of signaling their ability
to future employers. We do not model the future labor market outcomes of
developers beyond the current OSS project. Hence our analysis does not capture
the true signaling aspects of OSS contributions when employers cannot directly
observe developer ability. Thus, in the context of our model, the reputational
prize, S, should be interpreted as an ego gratification payoff that increases the

6 In our view this is a reasonable assumption given what programmers themselves say about
what motivates them. For example, noted open-source advocate Eric Raymond (1999), in his
treatise on the development of Linux, says that programmers are driven by ego gratification and
building a reputation among hackers. According to him, the open-source process channels
developers’ ego utility to look for complex errors in the code, which is much more challenging
than actually fixing the bugs once they are found. Raymond also acknowledges that programmers do not enjoy documentation which involves describing details about the program’s
features to other users and application developers.
7 It may be argued that proprietary firms can also provide reputational incentives for their
developers by publicly providing signals of employee performance, for example through promotions (see Bar-Isaac, Jewitt, and Leaver 2014). However, without making the actual software
contributions public, the proprietary license owner can never achieve the same degree of
transparency as an open-source license does.
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utility of the winning developer. In this sense, the value of this prize is also a
part of the total welfare maximized by the social planner.8
Third, an OSS license also provides some altruistic utility to the developers,
which is denoted by BðLÞ; where9
8
Br if L ¼ R;
<
r
BðLÞ ¼ ðB  ΔBÞ if L ¼ NR;
:
0 otherwise:
We assume that 0  ΔB  Br , i.e. the altruistic payoff from a fully open license is
higher than the payoff in a license that allows proprietarization. Thus the total
value to the developer across all stages of the software development is
V ¼ BðLÞ þ E ½SðLÞ þ E ½u, where E ½SðLÞ is the expected value of the reputational prize and E ½u is the total expected user value realized at the end of
Stage 2. Finally, note that the ðM  N Þ end users only get the user value from the
final software product, E ½u.
The timing of the game is as follows. The project leader, facing a competitive
market for hiring the N developers, chooses a license and pays an entry wage to
attract these developers. After the developers are hired, they provide effort toward
the design value of the software. The developers then exert effort to provide
commercial value to the software. After the commercialization process, the final
software is consumed by the developers themselves and other end-users and the
game ends.10 Following is the description of each stage of the game in summary:
8
Decision maker : Project leader
>
>
>
>
>
ðiÞ Choose a license ðproprietary; restrictive;
<
Stage 0 
or non  restrictiveÞ:
>
Actions :
>
>
ðiiÞ Compete to “hire” N developers by giving
>
>
:
entry wage:

8 We briefly discuss the implication of this specification for the signaling payoff in Section 5,
where we examine the welfare implications of an open-source license.
9 We can think of this as the “reciprocal altruism” described by Athey and Ellison (2014),
although we do not explicitly model this part of the utility as they do.
10 In software parlance, the stage game described here is known as the “waterfall” model
where software development occurs in a sequence of non-parallel steps. This has been the
traditional model of software development and is widely used by many project managers. More
recently, some software experts have been promoting an “iterative” model where development
occurs through a series of loops with constant feedback from earlier stages to later stages of the
process. Each loop within the iterative model can be thought of as a reduced form waterfall
model. In that sense, our model can be easily extended to be a finitely repeated game without
substantially altering the main predictions of the paper. We thank an anonymous referee for
pointing us to this distinction.
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Decision maker : Project leader if proprietary; developer if OSS
Stage 1 
Actions :
Effort provision in design stage
8
Project leader if proprietary or non  restrictive;
<
Decision maker :
Stage 2 
developer if restrictive:
:
Actions :
Effort provision in commercialization stage:

The equilibrium concept used is Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (hence we solve the
game using backward induction to find the equilibrium). We restrict our focus to
symmetric equilibria only. We solve Stage 2 and then Stage 1 to get the effort
provision under each licensing choice in the next section. Then, given these, we
solve Stage 0 to determine the equilibrium choice of license in Section 4.

3 Effort Provision by Developers
The incentives for effort provision by developers depend on the stage of the
software development process and the type of license under which the software
is being produced. Below we describe the equilibrium effort and the resulting
software’s user value under each of the three kinds of licenses. We then describe
the licensing choice in the next section.

3.1 Benchmark: First Best Efficient Outcome
Before we look at the equilibrium effort provision under each license type, it is
useful to examine how a welfare maximizing social planner sets effort levels at
each stage. Note that, for any given effort level in both stages, the restrictive OSS
license provides the highest welfare across all license types. This is because the
open development process not only provides a reputational payoff S to the
winner by making her innovation visible to the software community, it also
provides the highest altruistic benefit to the developers. Hence a social planner
maintains openness at all stages of the development process. Given this production process, at each stage, the social planner chooses effort to maximize the
total value across all M users net of effort cost across the N developers. So in
Stage 2, given the realization of D, the social planner chooses e2 to maximize:
V2o ðe2 jDÞ ¼ M ðDNe2 Þ  Nce2 :

½1

Let eo2 ðDÞ represent the optimal effort in Stage 2. Comparing the marginal
cost and marginal benefit from commercialization effort, the social planner
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chooses positive effort if and only if D  Mc . In other words, positive commercialization effort is efficient if and only if the realized design value exceeds a
threshold. Thus,
8
c
>
< 1 if D  ;
M
o
½2
e2 ðDÞ ¼
>
: 0 if D < c :
M
Since commercialization of the software in Stage 2 is efficient if and only if D
is high enough, this means that if the software is developed at all by the social
c
planner, design effort in Stage 1 must be high enough, in particular, eo1  2M
. If
c
c
c
o
e1 < 2M , then e1 "i < M for all i, so that D ¼ maxfe1 "i g < M and e2 ¼ 0. For all
i
c
e1  2M
, the total expected surplus from design effort is:
V1o ðe1 Þ ¼ NBr þ S þ NE½ðMD  cÞe2   Nce1 :

½3

Let us define the stochastic variable x ¼ maxf"i g, then D ¼ e1 x. Let us
i
define f ðxÞ as the density function for x over the support ½0; 2 which is derived
from the i.i.d. uniform distributions of each "i for i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; N. Then, given eo2
described in eq. [2], commercialization effort is exerted if and only if x  Mec 1 , so
that the total expected surplus is:
8
9
>
>
ð2
<
=
S
V1o ðe1 Þ ¼ N Br þ þ ðMe1 x  cÞf ðxÞdx  ce1 ;
>
>
N
:
;
c
Me1

and the derivative with respect to e1 is:
9
8
>
>
ð2
=
<
@ o
V1 ðe1 Þ ¼ N
Mxf ðxÞdx  c :
>
>
@e1
;
:c
Me1

As we can see above, the marginal benefit from higher design effort is only
realized when commercialization occurs, i.e. for x  Mec 1 . However, the marginal
cost of design effort is always just the constant c. As design effort increases, the
probability that commercialization occurs increases, so that the expected marginal benefit increases. As a result, the total expected surplus is convex in
design effort. Also observe that effort level only influences the user value of
the software and not the reputational prize.
Given the convexity of the expected surplus from the software V1o ðe1 Þ, the
optimal design effort is either zero so that the software is not developed at all by
the social planner or eo1 ¼ 1. The social planner chooses to produce the software
and eo1 ¼ 1 as long as the expected surplus is positive: V1o ð1Þ  0. When Br and NS
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are very high, this is true at all effort costs. However, if Br and NS are low, V1o ð1Þ
can be negative if the marginal effort cost is high. When this is possible, let us
define co as the threshold level of marginal cost where V1o ð1; co Þ ¼ 0. Then the
social surplus from the software is positive if and only if c < co .
The following lemma characterizes the first best outcome for effort provision
at each stage.
Lemma 1 Software development is not efficient if the altruistic and signaling
benefits are very low and marginal cost of effort is very high, i.e. Br þ NS < 2M
and c > co . Otherwise, it is always efficient to develop the software under an opensource license with eo1 ¼ 1 and eo2 ðDÞ as defined in eq. [2].
Lemma 1 shows that expected surplus is negative and software development is
not socially valuable when developers’ benefits from reputation and altruism are
low and effort cost is high. As we show in the next section, a proprietary license
may not produce the software even if its social value exceeds the effort cost of
developing the software.

3.2 Proprietary License
In a proprietary license, the project leader controls the effort provided by the
developer at every stage of the production process (refer to the summary of the
game at the end of Section 2). We assume that a developer’s reservation wage
once she has been employed in a given software project is zero.11 Hence the
project leader pays every developer a wage exactly equal to her cost of effort.
Thus, once they are hired, developers do not make any surplus in the labor
market. In the consumers’ market, after the final software has been produced,
the project leader acts as a monopolist and charges a price that is equal to the
consumer’s surplus of each user. So developers do not gain any surplus from
using the software either and the project leader appropriates all the gains from
the software production process.12 Another important feature of the proprietary
license in our model is that developers’ design innovations are not made public
and hence there is no reputational payoff.

11 This is true for instance if there are non-compete clauses in the employment contract that
prevent the developer from working for another project, or if there is a potential for copyright
infringement lawsuits by the project leader if the developer tries to use the current software in
another venture.
12 We assume perfect monitoring so there is no moral hazard problem of workers shirking.
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Let us start by looking at Stage 2. Given the realized design value D and a
commercial value of Z, the total user value of the software is DZ to each user.
Since there are M users, if the project leader charges a price p ¼ DZ, the revenue
from the software is M ðDZ Þ. The cost of effort to each of the N developers from
effort level e2i is ce2i which is then the wage paid by the project leader. Hence the
total cost of production in the second stage is Nce2i . If the project leader chooses
an effort level of e2 for each developer, her profit is:
π 2 ðe2 jDÞ ¼ M ðDNe2 Þ  Nce2 :

½4

The project leader’s objective function in Stage 2 shown in eq. [4] is identical to
the social planner’s objective described in eq. [1]. This means that given D, the
proprietary license provides ex post efficient commercialization effort, i.e.
ep2 ðDÞ ¼ eo2 ðDÞ.
Now in Stage 1, given ep2 ðDÞ, the project leader chooses design effort once
again to maximize total expected profits. Let e1 be the effort required by each
developer. Then the expected payoff to the project leader is:
π 1 ðe1 Þ ¼ NE½ðMD  cÞe2   Nce1 :

½5

Comparing eqs [5] and [3], we see that marginal effect of design effort is the
same on expected profits as on the social planner’s expected surplus. However,
since the proprietary license suppresses both the reputational payoff to the
winner and the altruistic benefits from sharing the software across all users,
profits are lower than the potential social value of the software. This means that
the project leader has a lower incentive to develop the software than the social
planner.
Let us define cp such that π 1 ð1; cp Þ ¼ 0; i.e. E ðMD  cp Þ  cp ¼ 0 where
p
c 2 ðN; M Þ.
Proposition 1 (a) A proprietary license develops the software if and only if the
marginal cost of effort is low enough (when c  cp Þ. In that case, ep1 ¼ 1 and
ep2 ðDÞ ¼ eo2 ðDÞ as defined in eq. [2].
(b) A proprietary license may not provide the software even though a social
planner may find it optimal to develop the software, i.e. cp > co :
Part (a) of the proposition shows that as with the first best efficient outcome,
the project leader develops the software under a proprietary license if and only if
the cost of effort is low enough. Part (b), however, states that a proprietary
license may not provide the software even when there is social value from
developing it because, for any given effort cost, proprietary profits are lower
than the potential social value of the software. In this case, as we show in the
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next two subsections, an OSS license may provide the software. This contrasts
with the findings by Johnson (2002) who shows that OSS licenses sometimes fail
to provide socially valuable software where proprietary production does. Here
we find that the opposite can also happen, i.e. an OSS license may provide the
software although the user value does not justify the cost of proprietary production. This occurs because, in our model, the proprietary production process does
not provide altruistic and reputational benefits to software developers while an
open-source process does. Since these benefits are ignored in Johnson’s (2002)
analysis, the public good aspect of open-source production always creates an
under-supply of software relative to proprietary production in his model.

3.3 Restrictive OSS License
In a restrictive OSS license, the project leader does not control effort provision at
any stage (refer to the summary of the game at the end of Section 2) and she
does not get positive profits from the software. This is because the R license
forces the project leader to keep all software developments open. In this case,
developers appropriate their entire user value from the software in Stage 2. Thus
market price is trivially zero.13 Developers are paid a wage of zero and the
project leader makes zero profits.
Apart from the user payoff from the final software, developers also get a
reputational payoff of S if they produce the highest value innovation in the
design stage and an altruistic or ideological benefit Br from being engaged in a
copyleft license. In order to ensure the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, we
14
assume that Br > N2
N S.
Again, we start with equilibrium effort provision in the commercialization
stage. Given the realization of D in the previous stage and effort of all other
developers, e2j ¼ er2 , jÞi, the payoff from effort e2i to developer i is:


V2r ðe2i Þ ¼ D ðN  1Þer2 þ e2i  ce2i :
½6
We see from eq. [6] that developer i exerts effort for commercialization if and
only if D  c. Since c > Mc , for any given realization of D, equilibrium commercialization effort is less than optimal, i.e. er2 ðDÞ < eo2 ðDÞ. This is driven by the
public good nature of the OSS development process where all developers simultaneously benefit from a single developer’s effort.
13 This is because we have assumed that, once the software has been produced, distribution
costs are zero.
14 Details for this restriction are described in Appendix B.
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Next let us look at the incentives to provide design effort in Stage 1. The
expected payoff from design effort to developer i given that all other developers
contribute er1 is:




  
V1r e1i j er1 ¼ Br þ E S; e1i ; er1 þ E V2r er2  ce1i :
½7
Before we proceed with the equilibrium analysis, it is useful to explain the
race to win the reputational prize from design innovation among developers.
Since we restrict our results to a symmetric equilibrium, let us consider developer i’s expected value of winning the reputational prize with effort e1i ; given
that every other developer chooses er1j ¼ er1 ; jÞi: Developer i wins the prize if and
only if e1i "i  er1 "j for all jÞi. Under a uniform distribution for "i ; the expected
value of the prize is given by15


 

E S; e1i ; er1 ¼ S Pr e1i "i  e1 "j for all jÞi
8
0
if e1i ¼ 0 and e1  0;
>
>
>


>
>
Ð2 e1i "i N1 d"i
>
>
>
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e1 > e1i > 0;
>

2
>
>
0 e1 2
>
< 
2e
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¼ S eÐ1i1 
e1i "i N1 d"i
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>
>
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þ
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e1i  e1 > 0;
>
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>
e
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>
0
1
>

2e
>
>
1
>
e1i
>
>
:
1
if e1 ¼ 0 and e1i > 0:
Note that in a symmetric equilibrium, all developers put positive effort because


the best response to everyone else not working er1 ¼ 0 is to put a positive
amount of effort ðe1i > 0Þ, however, small. This means that the software is
always developed under an OSS license.
It is useful to note the following features about the reputational payoff. First,
a priori, a symmetric equilibrium in effort provision means that the reputational
payoff is independent of effort. Since er1i ¼ er1 > 0, the expected payoff described
above becomes:
22
3
ð
N1 d"i
"
i
5¼ S:
E ðSÞ ¼ S4
N
2
2
0

So before production begins, effort choice has no impact on this payoff and all
OSS licenses yield the same expected reputational payoff. However, once
15 See Appendix A for a detailed derivation of this expected value of winning the reputational
prize. Also see Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) for a similar tournament model applied to human
capital investment.
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production has started under a license, the race to be the highest value contributor makes effort relevant to winning the prize. This provides the mechanism
for a possible over-provision of design effort with an OSS license in our model.
Next let us look at the expected user payoff in Stage 2 given design effort in
Stage 1. Given that all other developers are contributing e1j ¼ er1 , jÞi; and
developer i is contributing e1i , the expected user value net of effort cost to
developer i in Stage 2 is:




E V2r j er1 ; e1i ¼ E NDer2  cer2 ;
where D ¼ max er1 "j ; e1i "i jjÞi . Although the user benefit is determined by the
highest value innovator, all developers get the user benefit from this innovation
unlike the reputational prize which is enjoyed only by the winning developer.
This creates a public good under-provision problem in design effort.
The symmetric equilibrium in design effort, er1 ; is derived by comparing the

@EðS;er1 ;e1i Þ
@EðV2r jer1 ;e1i Þ
þ
to the marginal
marginal benefit from design effort
@e1i
@e1i
e1i ¼er1

cost, c. Lemma 2 describes

er1

and

er2 ðDÞ.

Lemma 2 (a) If c  2, then er1 ¼ 1 and

1 if
er2 ðDÞ ¼
0 if
(b) If c > 2, then er1 ¼ min

N1 S
N c;1

D  c;
D < c:

and er2 ¼ 0.

Lemma 2 shows that the restrictive OSS license always leads to positive effort
provision in the design stage because expected marginal benefit exceeds the
marginal cost of effort, c. On the other hand, commercialization occurs under
this license only if c is low enough.
Comparing part (b) of the lemma to the first best outcome described in
Lemma 1, we see that for costs high enough (c > co ), the OSS license overprovides design effort. Comparing effort provision under the R license to the
proprietary outcome described in Proposition 1, we find two differences. First,
with both commercialization and design efforts, there is a public good underprovision problem as every developer free-rides on the efforts of other developers. But the race to win the reputational prize may cause developers to overinvest in design effort in the open-source license. Design effort thus may be more
or less than that in P depending on which effect is stronger. Interestingly, it
is possible for socially beneficial software development to occur under the
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open-source license even though a proprietary license fails to provide the software. This occurs when c 2 ðcp ; co Þ.
In Proposition 2, we compare effort provision under R and P licenses.
Proposition 2 (a) Design effort under the restrictive OSS license (R) is strictly
higher than that under the proprietary license (P) if marginal cost of effort is high
p
ðc > cp Þ and it is strictly lower than proprietary design effort if N1
N S < c  c . In all
remaining cases, design effort is the same under R and P licenses.
(b) In Stage 2, given the realized design value D, the R license weakly underprovides commercialization effort compared to the P license or socially optimal
effort, i.e. er2 ðDÞ  ep2 ðDÞ ¼ eo2 ðDÞ.
The proposition above highlights the public good problem faced by an open-source
license. The user value generated from the software in Stage 2 is enjoyed by all
developers and end-users. Since the developer who undertakes effort in the commercialization stage only cares about her own value from her effort, the value
generated during this stage is less than optimal. This result is stated in part (b) of
the proposition above. However, part (a) shows that design effort may be higher or
lower under the OSS license as effort provision in this stage is governed by two
different incentives. The reputational incentive from producing the highest value
innovation creates a tendency among developers to over-invest. At the same time,
as in the commercialization stage, the design value generated by the winning
developer is enjoyed by all M users whether they contributed with effort or not.
When the value of the reputational prize is low, the over-investment effect in the
OSS license is weak, so that overall there is under-provision of design effort.

3.4 Non-Restrictive OSS License
With a non-restrictive OSS license, the project leader keeps the software development process open in the design stage, but can organize proprietary production in the commercialization stage (refer to the summary of the game at the end
of Section 2) and charge the monopoly price for the final software.16 Note that if

16 A valid concern here is that, since the codes developed in the design stage of the software
are open, the project leader may not have monopoly power over the final software product after
commercialization. At the same time, it is reasonable to assume that the user value added in the
commercialization stage produces at the very least a differentiated product giving the project
leader some degree of market power. Moreover, one can also expect that the platform provider
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the license allows the project leader to make any part of the software proprietary, she always chooses to do so since she can appropriate the entire value of
the software.
Here, the project leader does not control effort provision in the design stage.
Developers do not receive a wage in this stage, but they do receive a reputational payoff if they produce the highest value innovation. On the other hand,
users do not receive any consumers’ surplus in the second stage since the
project leader extracts their entire user value through the monopoly price.
During the commercialization stage, the project leader pays wages equal to the
cost of effort. As with the restrictive OSS license, each developer also receives an
altruistic benefit. Since the NR license does not keep the software development
process open at all stages, the altruistic benefit is smaller, i.e. ðBr  ΔBÞ; where




r
N2
ΔB 2 0; Br  N2
N S . As with the R license, we assume that B  ΔB þ N S to
ensure the existence of a symmetric equilibrium for every parameterization of c
and S.
In the commercialization stage, given D, the project leader chooses developers’
effort to maximize profits, π 2 ¼ ½M ðDNe2 Þ  Nce2  Ex post, this yields the optimal
p
o
effort level achieved through a proprietary license, i.e. enr
2 ð DÞ ¼ e2 ð DÞ ¼ e2 ð DÞ.
Next, in Stage 1, developers are the decision makers (since the design stage
is open) and the only incentive for design effort from developers is the reputational payoff from winning the prize (because all other consumers’ surplus
is extracted by the project leader after commercialization). The expected
payoff from design effort to developer i given that all other developers contribute enr
1 is:




¼ Br  ΔB þ E S; e1i ; enr
 ce1i :
V1nr e1i jenr
1
1
The symmetric equilibrium for design effort, enr
1 ; is derived by comparing the

nr
@E ðS;e1 ;e1i Þ
to marginal cost, c.
marginal benefit of design effort, i.e.
@e1i
e1i ¼enr
1

Lemma 3 states the equilibrium outcome in effort provision for each stage.
Lemma 3 a) enr
1 ¼ min

N1 S
N c;1

:

has an inherent advantage over other developers in commercializing its software applications.
For example, Google has closed many of its branded applications by making them proprietary.
Although its Android-operating system is open source, there have been very few alternative
applications of equal quality generated on this platform giving Google a near monopoly over
these applications (see Amadeo 2013).
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N1
N S

2

c
 2M
, then


enr
2 ð DÞ

and if

N1
N S
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¼

1
0

if
if

D  Mc ;
D < Mc ;

2

c
 2M
, then enr
2 ¼ 0.

Part a) shows that design effort is weakly increasing in S. Further part b)
shows that if S is too low so that design effort is low, then the realized value of D
is always below the threshold and commercialization never occurs.
Comparing the effort levels described in Lemma 3 to proprietary effort
levels, we find the following. As with the R license, it is possible to have both
over- and under-provision of design effort. Second, although commercialization
effort under the P and NR licenses are ex post equal (i.e. for a given realization
of D), the expected value of commercialization effort ex ante may be different.
For example, when c > cp , ex ante commercialization effort is higher under NR
licenses (since it is zero under proprietary production). On the other hand, if
c  cp , but N1
N S < c, then expected commercialization level is lower under an
NR license.
Relative to the R license, we see that the NR license always provides lower
r
design effort, i.e. enr
1  e1 . This is because developers only receive the reputational payoff from design effort in the NR license. Ex post, commercialization
effort is always higher under NR, i.e. er2 ðDÞ  enr
2 ð DÞ. However, since design
effort is higher under R, this may stimulate greater commercialization. Hence
the expected value of commercialization effort may be higher or lower than
under an R license.
It is also worth noting that since design effort under the NR license is
driven solely by the race to win the reputational prize, design effort
depends on S, and in particular, increases with S. On the other hand,
when the R license generates the possibility of commercialization, i.e.
when c < 2, the net user value from the commercial software dominates
the decision regarding effort provision, so that er1 ¼ 1 which is independent
of S. This generates a counter-intuitive yet interesting hypothesis about
non-restrictive OSS licenses – that effort provision is driven more by
reputational concerns than commercial user value under non-restrictive
licenses relative to restrictive licenses. This is because developers appropriate more user value from the software under an R license than under an
NR license.
The following proposition compares efforts across the three licenses discussed above.
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Proposition 3 Comparing design and commercialization efforts across the three
licenses, we find the following: (a) Design effort under a non-restrictive OSS license
(NR) may be higher or lower than proprietary design effort, however it is always
weakly lower than design effort under a restrictive OSS license (R). (b) The
expected value of commercialization effort with an NR license is higher than with
proprietary license (P) if and only if c > cp (i.e. when P does not provide the
software). (c) Relative to an R license, expected commercialization effort under
an NR license is higher if and only if either c > 2 (i.e. when R does not provide the
Nc
software) or reputational benefit is high enough S  ðN1
ÞM .

The result derived in Proposition 3 addresses a few empirical findings on the
development of software under OSS licenses. First, our result that design effort is
higher under an R license is supported by Colazo and Fang (2009) who find that
restrictive OSS licenses have more coding activity and faster development speed
than non-restrictive licenses. Second, some researchers have found that restrictive OSS licenses have a negative impact on their performance. For example,
Subramaniam, Sen, and Nelson (2009) find that restrictive licenses are less likely
to generate successful projects. Similarly, Comino, Manenti, and Parisi (2007)
find that software distributed under non-restrictive licenses are more likely to
reach a mature and stable release. In contrast to these results, we find that
relative effort level between R and NR licenses depends on the stage of the
development process as well as the size of the reputational prize. In particular,
while contributions in the early stages of the development process are always
higher under R licenses, effort to commercialize the software may be higher or
lower depending on how important reputational concerns are. This apparent
contradiction is driven by endogeneity in licensing choice. As we argue in the
next section, much of the negative correlation between software performance
and license restrictiveness is driven by other factors that influence both effort
provision and choice of license. For example, we show that NR licenses are more
likely to be selected when reputational benefit, S, is high. Since effort provision
in both stages is weakly increasing in S, NR licenses are selected in projects that
generate high user value.

4 Choice of License
Before production starts, at Stage 0, the project leader chooses the license under
which she organizes software development. We model this licensing choice in a
competitive market of many projects where the leader of each of these projects is
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competing to attract N developers. This means that every project leader makes
zero profits at this stage. Hence, given a particular license, the entry wage paid
to developers is simply the profits to the project leader after commercialization.17
In case of the restrictive OSS license, the entry wage is simply zero, since
developers determine their own effort level at every stage and no profits are
made on the final software. With the proprietary license and the non-restrictive
OSS license, the project leader generates positive profits from selling the final
software. Competition among project leaders to hire developers means that this
profit is transferred to developers via the entry wage. Given N identical developers, the entry wage for each developer in this case is simply N1 times the project
leader’s profit.
Further, given a competitive market, in order to attract developers to her
project, the project leader must choose the license that maximizes total expected
surplus to developers. The surplus to each developer under a given license,
V d ðLÞ, is the sum of the entry wage, the altruistic utility, the expected reputational payoff and consumer’s surplus that the developer may receive as a user.
Since the wage received in each stage of software development is the same as
the cost of effort, it cancels out from the surplus calculation. Hence the total
surplus to a developer under each kind of license, denoted by V d ðLÞ; is given by:


8
if L ¼ P;
E ðMD  cÞep2  cep1
>
>
<


d
r
S
r
r
½8
V ð LÞ ¼
B þ N þ E ðND  cÞe2  ce1
if L ¼ R;
>
>


: r
nr
B  ΔB þ NS þ E ðMD  cÞenr
if L ¼ NR:
2  ce1
It is useful to explain what creates the difference in surplus across licenses.
First, OSS licenses provide reputational benefit and altruistic utility which is
absent in the proprietary model. This tends to make an OSS license more
desirable to developers. However, since developers also consume the final software, they care about the user value of the software as well. Since the proprietary license provides optimal effort to maximize user value (relative to effort
cost), it may generate greater value to developers than an OSS license. Finally, it
is important to note that, in an R license, the final software is freely provided to
all users. So even though developers receive positive consumers’ surplus, they
do not appropriate any consumers’ surplus from the ðM  N Þ end-users who
only consume the software free of charge. On the other hand, both the P and NR
licenses generate a profit by selling to end-users at a positive price. Since this

17 See Ghosh and Waldman (2010) for a similar setup on how firms choose wage and promotion contracts when there is competition between firms to hire workers.
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profit is transferred to developers through the entry wage, it tends to make the R
license less appealing to developers.
Next, we compare the surplus to developers from each kind of license in
order to determine which license is chosen in equilibrium. Below we characterize the choice between proprietary and open-source licenses for the case where
c  2 so that commercialization is possible under all three licenses.18
We first describe the conditions under which a proprietary license is chosen
over an open-source one. The primary benefit that the proprietary license yields
to developers’ total surplus is that, when the proprietary license provides the
software, it optimizes user value for the software. On the negative side, it does
not provide any altruistic or reputational benefit to developers. When c  2, the
proprietary license may dominate both the OSS licenses if the reputational
benefit S is small. Conversely, if reputational benefit S is high, then an opensource license dominates a proprietary license.
As explained in Section 3.3, when commercialization is possible under the R
license (i.e. c  2), design effort er1 ¼ 1 which is independent of the reputational
prize S. On the other hand, enr
1 weakly increases with S. In order to understand
how the value to developers is affected by the two open-source licenses, let us
look at eq. [8].
The value of the R license increases linearly with S, since design effort is
independent of reputational incentives. But the value of the NR license is convex
in S. This is because a higher reputational prize reduces reputational surplus by
stimulating greater competition among developers to win the innovation prize


d S
nr
(i.e. dS
< 0), but it improves the net commercial value generated by the
N  ce1


d
license by inducing greater effort, (i.e. dS
E ðMD  cÞenr
> 0). As the reputational
2
benefit S gets larger, the marginal effect on commercial value becomes more
dominant. As a result, the effect of S on the overall value provided by the NR
license first decreases and then increases. Thus for S high enough, the NR
license provides high commercial value to users while also generating a higher
surplus to developers compared to the R license as long as the altruistic gains
from the latter are not too large.
It is straightforward to see that for any given level of developers ðN Þ, as the
number of users ðM Þ increases, the lost surplus from end-users in the R becomes
greater. Thus as the commercial value of the software increases with M, the NR
license becomes more valuable to developers relative to the R license.
In order to simplify the exposition of the trade-offs posed by reputational
benefit and commercial value, we assume that the difference in altruistic benefit
18 For c > 2; so that commercialization is not possible under R license, a qualitatively similar
dominance relationship holds between P; R and NR licenses as described in Proposition 4.
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between the OSS licenses, given by ΔB; is not too low so that there is always a
positive measure of S where R dominates NR. Let us denote this altruism threshb Then we assume that ΔB  ΔB
b so that when reputational benefit
old by ΔB.
19
d
d
S ¼ 0, V ðRÞ  V ðNRÞ.
Proposition 4 Suppose that all three licenses provide commercialization
effort (i.e. c  2) and the difference in altruistic benefit between the non-restrictive
b Then the
(NR) license and the restrictive (R) license is large (i.e. ΔB  ΔB).
proprietary license is chosen if and only if reputational benefit ðSÞ is low enough;
otherwise one of the OSS licenses is chosen. Among the OSS licenses, NR dominates
R if and only if the user population ðM Þ and S are large enough (the cutoffs for M
and S are described in the appendix).
Proposition 4 provides insight about how licenses relate to software project
characteristics. Lerner and Tirole (2005) find that software projects with high
commercial value are likely to be released under non-restrictive licenses. This is
supported by the finding in our model that NR is a more valuable license when
the user population M is large. Further, we also find that projects that provide
high reputational value are more likely to have NR licenses. This provides
support to Lerner and Tirole’s (2005) finding that software geared toward other
developers is more likely to be developed under a non-restrictive license.
Software targeting the developer community provides a knowledgeable audience of software intellectuals and hence is likely to involve very large reputational payoffs from effort. In terms of our analysis, this translates into a large S
and hence, by Proposition 4, NR dominates R in equilibrium.
Further, endogenizing the license allows us to explain why non-restrictive
licenses are more likely to generate successful software. Since the expected
reputational benefit from the two licenses is the same (S=N), the NR license is
chosen only if it provides greater user value than R.
Proposition 4 also provides empirically testable hypotheses about the relationship between software licensing and project characteristics. As the results
show, among software projects that yield the same altruistic and reputational
benefits to the developer, projects with larger user population tend to favor less
restrictive licenses. At the same time, if reputational benefits depend on how
knowledgeable the end-user population is, then for any given size of the enduser base, a larger proportion of software developers among end-users favors an
open-source license over a proprietary one; and further within open-source
licenses, such projects are more likely to adopt a non-restrictive license.

19 The explicit parametric restriction on ΔB is described in the proof of Proposition 4 in
^
Appendix B. The results are qualitatively similar for ΔB < ΔB:
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5 Welfare Analysis
The equilibrium choice of license that emerges in the market is driven by
developers’ surplus. In this section, we look at how a social planner chooses
the appropriate license to balance out user value to consumers and reputational
benefits to developers. The social planner’s choice of license then characterizes
the second best efficient outcome where effort levels are allowed to be determined by the market. Given the market equilibrium outcome in Stages 1 and 2,
the social planner chooses the license to maximize the total surplus to users,
developers and the project leader.
Let us denote V o ðLÞ as the total surplus from license L. V o ðLÞ is then the
sum of the project leader’s payoff, developers’ surplus and end-user consumers’
surplus from the final software. If the license is proprietary or non-restrictive, the
surplus of all N developers, NV d ðLÞ, also captures the total surplus for the social
planner. This is because, after commercialization, the project leader appropriates the entire consumers’ surplus through price and the resulting profits are
then transferred to developers through an entry wage at the time of hire. As a
result, the social planner’s choice between the P and NR licenses is the same as
a developer’s choice between the two at the time of hire.
However, in the R license, the total surplus is greater than the surplus to all
N developers, i.e. V o ðRÞ > NV d ðRÞ. This is because, in the absence of a positive
price for the final software, developers only care about their own user value, but
not the user value provided to the ðM  N Þ end-users in the market. Since there
is no means of transferring end-user surplus to developers under this license, a
positive externality is generated which causes the social value of production to
exceed the market’s value under R. Total surplus is then given as follows:

d
if L 2 fP; NRg;
NV
o
 ð LÞ

V ð LÞ ¼
NBr þ S þ NE ðMD  cÞer2  Ncer1 if
L ¼ R:
The presence of positive externalities in the development of software under the R
license implies that the social planner may choose this license even though the
market does not. It is also possible that the market’s licensing choice sometimes
is welfare maximizing and, in particular, that the P license is efficient in some
cases. Proposition 5 outlines this result.
b the following
Proposition 5 Retaining the restrictions that c  2 and ΔB  ΔB,
describes the features of the second best efficient license chosen by a social planner.
a) The proprietary license (P) is efficient if reputational benefit to developers
ðSÞ is low enough. In every case where the social planner chooses an OSS license,
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the non-restrictive (NR) license is more efficient than the restrictive license (R) if
and only if both the number of users ðM Þ and S are large enough.
b) Comparing the equilibrium and efficient license, the market chooses R
licenses less often and the P and NR licenses at least as often as the social
planner, i.e. the range of S and M where R (NR or P) is efficient is strictly larger
(weakly smaller) than the parameter range where it is chosen in equilibrium.
Proposition 5 allows us to look at the implication of public policies around the
choice of license. Governments in many countries including the USA have tried
to encourage the use of open-source licenses such as GPL. For example, the UK
recently mandated the use of OSS in all government projects whenever available. Similarly, the city of Munich in Germany migrated from Microsoft operating
system to OSS and France has also sought to ban the use of proprietary software
in government bodies. In the USA, the government provides R&D support for
projects released under GPL.20 Part b) of Proposition 5 states that the market
under-provides the R license relative to its social value, and hence this provides
a justification for preferential public policy toward restrictive OSS licenses. At
the same time, it also highlights the fact that the specific nature of the OSS
alternative is an important policy consideration. Specifically, we find that, as
long as the labor market for developers is competitive, there is no case for
preferential treatment in public policy toward NR OSS licenses. Further, as
part a) of the proposition shows, it is also possible in some cases that proprietary
production chosen by the market is desirable from an efficiency perspective so
that a blanket subsidization of OSS with no regard to the project’s characteristics
is suboptimal.
The results presented in Proposition 5 identify one potential market failure
that arises in the choice of licenses, namely positive externalities in the development of OSS under a restrictive license. At the same time we acknowledge that
there may be other elements of efficiency that our current model overlooks. For
instance, as mentioned in Section 2, we assume that the signaling incentive for
effort provision under OSS is driven purely by ego gratification which directly
enhances the utility to developers. All else equal, this makes OSS always more
efficient than proprietary production. A different reward mechanism for this
payoff under OSS may create inefficiencies that are not present in the proprietary model. As an example we could have considered a labor market signaling
model like Spence (1973), where winning the design value in an OSS serves as a
signal for unobserved worker ability to future employers. This enhances future
20 See Schmidt and Schnitzer (2003) for other examples of countries that have adopted a
preferential approach toward OSS.
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wages to the developer. If developer effort toward this reward does not add any
social value (either in terms of the future productivity of the developer or his
utility), then a social planner will have no reason to strictly prefer an OSS license
to a proprietary one in the first best outcome.21 In reality, the signaling motive
for the developer’s participation in OSS is likely to be a combination of egogratification and labor market signaling. To the extent that developers receive a
direct utility payoff from having their innovations publicly observed in an opensource model, our welfare results hold.

6 Conclusion
Our paper provides an integrated theoretical framework to analyze the economic
incentives governing various stages of OSS development. We use this framework
to explain the choice between restrictive and non-restrictive licenses adopted by
various OSS.
We build our theory of OSS development by characterizing a typical software development process as comprising of two broad stages – Stage 1 or the
“Design” stage where developers invest effort to design and test the software
and Stage 2 or the “Commercialization” stage where developers add user value
to the software to make it more commercially usable by a general market. We
then describe the incentives governing the investment of effort in each stage of
OSS development. Effort provision in the design stage is driven by two motives –
reputational benefits from winning a prize to the highest value innovation, and
expected future benefits as a user of the OSS. Effort in the commercialization
stage is driven solely by user benefits. We then derive the equilibrium effort
provision in each stage under a restrictive and a non-restrictive OSS license
separately. Finally, we characterize the project leader’s choice of license in the
context of a competitive market of projects for hiring developers given the
equilibrium effort provision following the licensing choice. This allows us to
then describe the conditions governing the choice between the three kinds of
licenses.
The results of our theoretical model explain empirical evidence about the
relationship between features of the OSS and the license adopted for the software. In particular, we explain the following facts about restrictive and non-

21 Also see Holmstrom (1999). Holmstrom argues that managers driven by future wage concerns may not make correct investment decisions if they are risk averse and the returns to their
investment provide a noisy signal of their true ability.
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restrictive OSS licenses. First, software projects released under restrictive
licenses are less likely to achieve a mature or stable release (Comino, Manenti,
and Parisi 2007). Second, software projects with high commercial value are more
likely to be released under non-restrictive licenses (Lerner and Tirole 2005).
Our analysis suggests some additional testable implications. We find that if
the number of software users is large, then design effort exerted by developers
under OSS licenses is higher than that in a proprietary license. Also, while
analyzing the equilibrium choice of license, we find that if reputational benefit
is high, then the non-restrictive OSS license emerges in equilibrium. Conversely,
when reputational benefit is very low, then a proprietary license is chosen.
Among OSS licenses, the restrictive license is chosen when the number of software users is small and reputational gains are low.
From a welfare perspective, we find that the market equilibrium generates
fewer restrictive licenses than what is efficient for the society, thus providing a
case for some subsidization of restrictive open-source licenses. At the same time,
we find that there is no case for subsidizing non-restrictive open-source licenses.
Our model has some limitations. In our model, the number of developers
ðN Þ is exogenous. However, in reality, project leaders can decide who joins the
project and how many developers should participate in its development.
Extending our model to make the number of developers endogenous is likely
to provide some interesting implications of the software license on the size of the
developer community. In addition, while our paper assumes that a single license
is chosen for each software, in some cases software is simultaneously released
under a proprietary license as well as an open-source license (dual license).
Typically, use of the proprietary license requires a payment to the license owner,
while the open-source version requires all modifications to be kept open as with
the restrictive license. The two main benefits of using a dual license is to allow
the license owner to appropriate some of the future proprietary profits generated
from the dual licensed software and to allow license compatibility with other
software released under restrictive terms (Valimaki 2003; Comino and Manenti
2011). On the other hand, the restrictive license poses a competitive threat to the
proprietary version especially if it generates a better software product to users.
Since we do not explicitly model competition in the software market postcommercialization, analyzing the merits of dual licensing is beyond the scope
of our current paper. Nevertheless, the model presented here provides fruitful
avenues for future extensions to study when and why dual licenses exist.
Finally, our paper ignores license compatibility issues that may affect the design
or commercialization value of the software. The terms of restrictive licenses,
such as GPL, usually create a conflict when the software is combined with other
differently licensed code. Thus, if a significant proportion of software is released
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under a GPL license, the value of the GPL license for a new software increases as
the proportion of other software released under this license increase. This
creates a form of network effect in the use of restrictive licenses as more licenses
are released in order to maintain this compatibility. We believe that incorporating this issue in examining licensing choice is likely to address many empirical
findings such as why a significant portion of open-source code has a GPL license
despite the fact that it appears to be less successful than other non-restrictive
licenses.

Appendix
A Derivation: Expected Value of the Reputational Prize


Below we derive the expression of E S; e1i ; e1 , which shows the expected value
of winning the reputational prize from producing the highest value innovation in
the design stage in an OSS.
Let us consider developer i’s effort, e1i , given that all other developers jÞi
invest effort e1 . Then developer i gets the reputational prize S if and only if
e1i "i  e1 "j for all jÞi, i.e.


 

E S; e1i ; e1 ¼ S Pr e1i "i  e1 "j for all jÞi :


If e1i ¼ 0, then there is no chance of winning the prize, so E S; e1i ; e1 ¼ 0. At the
other extreme, if e1i > 0 and e1 ¼ 0, then i wins the prize for sure and


E S; e1i ; e1 ¼ S.
If e1 > 0 and e1i > 0, then we have to consider two cases, one where e1  e1i
and the other where e1 > e1i .
(i) If e1  e1i , then i wins the prize if and only if "j  ee1i "i for every jÞi. Since
2e

1

the support for "j is ½0; 2, if ee1i "i > 2, i.e. "i > e1i1 , then i wins the prize for
1
h
i
h
iN1
2e1
sure. For "i 2 0; e1i , i’s probability of winning is Pr "j  ee1i "i
1

¼

e1i "i
e1 2

N1

under the i.i.d. uniform distribution for "j . So the total

expected probability of winning over all "i is:


Pr e1i "i 

e1 "j


for all jÞi ¼

2e
1
e1i

ð
0

e1i "i
e1 2

N1

d"i
þ
2

ð2
2e
1
e1i

d"i
:
2
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(ii)

If e1 > e1i , then "i  2 <

2e1
e1i ,
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which means that for any given realization of

"i , the probability of winning S is

e1i "i
e1 2

N1

. So the probability of winning

the prize in this case is:


Pr e1i "i 

e1 "j


for all jÞi ¼


ð2 
e1i "i N1 d"i
:
e1 2
2
0

Combining the derivations above, the expected value of the reputational prize
for developer i; given that she exerts effort e1i and all other developers jÞi exert
effort e1 ; is:


E S; e1i ; e1 ¼ S  probability of winning the prize
 

¼ S Pr e1i "i  e1 "j for all jÞi
8
0
if e1i ¼ 0 and e1  0;
>
>
>
>
>
Ð2 e1i "i N1 d"i
>
>
if
e1 > e1i > 0;
>
>
e1 2
2
>
>
0
<

¼ S 2ee 1
>
Ð1i e1i "i N1 d"i Ð2 d"i
>
>
if
e1i  e1 > 0;
>
>
e1 2
2 þ
2
>
2e
>
0
1
>
>
e1i
>
>
:
1
if e1 ¼ 0 and e1i > 0:

B Proofs of the Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1. Taking Stage 2 efforts first, given D,

@
@e2

 o

V2 ðe2 jDÞ

¼ M ðDN Þ  Nc  0 if and only if D  Mc . Hence eo2 ðDÞ ¼ 1 if D  Mc and 0 otherwise. In Stage 1, the expected surplus from design effort, V1o ðe1 Þ is convex in e1 .
Since the value from not developing the software is zero, the social planner
chooses to develop the software as an open source if and only if V1o ð1Þ  0.
V1o ð1; cÞ is decreasing in c and it is positive at c ¼ 0. If Br þ NS  2M  0, then
V1o ð1Þ  0 for all c  2M. If Br þ NS  2M < 0, then V1o ð1Þ  0 if and only if c  co ,
where co solves V1o ð1; co Þ ¼ 0.
■
Proof of Proposition 1. (a) Since π 2 ðe2 jDÞ ¼ V2o ðe2 jDÞ, eo2 ðDÞ ¼ ep2 ðDÞ. In Stage 1,
π 1 ðe1 Þ ¼ V1o ðe1 Þ  NBr  S. Hence π 1 ðe1 Þ is also convex in e1 , and ep1 ¼ 1 if
π 1 ð1Þ  0 and zero otherwise. π 1 ð1Þ is decreasing in c. It is positive at c ¼ N
and negative at c ¼ M. Hence we define cp 2 ðN; M Þ as π 1 ð1; cp Þ ¼ 0. Then ep1 ¼ 1
if c  cp and ep1 ¼ 0 if c > cp .
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(b) From Lemma 1, if Br þ NS  2M  0, then we can define co ¼ 2M since the
social planner always chooses to develop the software and hence cp < co . If
Br þ NS  2M < 0, then at cp , V1o ð1; cp Þ ¼ NBr þ S > 0. Hence again, cp < co .
■
Proof of Lemma 2. First let us derive Stage 2 commercialization effort given the
realized value of D. From (6), we can see that @e@2i V2ir ðe2i Þ  0 if and only if D  c.
Hence for all i, e2i ðDÞ ¼ er2 ðDÞ ¼ 1 if D  c and 0 otherwise.


Now for the first-stage effort, we need to derive the E V2r jer1 ; e1i . Suppose
Gð:Þ denotes the c.d.f. for D ¼ max er1 "j ; e1i "i jjÞi , and g ð:Þ is the corresponding
p.d.f. over the support ½0; 2. Let us look at the following cases.
(1) If e1i < c2 and er1 < c2, then for every realization of "i and "jÞi , er2 ¼ 0 since


D < c. In this case E V2r jer1 ; e1i ¼ 0.
(2) If er1 < c2  e1i , then for x > 2e1i > c, GðxÞ ¼ PrðD < xÞ ¼ 1 and g ðxÞ ¼ 0.
N1




For x 2 0; 2er1 , GðxÞ ¼ PrðD < xÞ ¼ Pr er1 "j < xjjÞi Prðe1i "i < xÞ ¼ 2ex r
1

x
2e1i

and g ðxÞ ¼ N

1
2e1i

x
2er1

N1



¼ g1 ðxÞ; say. For x 2 2er1 ; 2e1i , GðxÞ ¼ Pr

ðe1i "i < xÞ ¼ 2ex1i and g ðxÞ ¼ 2e11i ¼ g2 ðxÞ; say. Hence,
8
g1 ðxÞ if x  2er1 ;
<
g ðxÞ ¼ g2 ðxÞ if 2er1 < x  2e1i ;
:
0 otherwise:
Given that er2 ¼ 1 if and only if D  c and 0 otherwise, V2r is positive only for




x 2 ½c; 2e1i . Since c > 2er1 , this means that E V2r jer1 ; e1i ¼ E NDer2  cer2 ¼
2e
Ð1i
ðNx  cÞg2 ðxÞdx.
c

(3)

c
2

If

 er1  e1i , g ðxÞ is the same as above, but now c  2er1 . So
r

2e

 2eÐ 1
Ð1i
E V2r jer1 ; e1i ¼ ðNx  cÞg1 ðxÞdx þ ðNx  cÞg2 ðxÞdx.

(4)

c
2er1


If c2  e1i < er1 , then for x 2 ½0; 2e1i  we have g ðxÞ ¼ g1 ðxÞ. For x 2 2e1i ; 2er1 ,



GðxÞ ¼ PrðD < xÞ ¼ Pr er1 "j < xjjÞi ¼

say. For x >

Thus E



V2r jer1 ; e1i



2er1 ,

¼

N1

and g ðxÞ ¼ ðN  1Þ 2e1 r

1

GðxÞ ¼ 1. Hence,
8
< g1 ðxÞ if x  2e1i ;
g ðxÞ ¼ g3 ðxÞ if 2e1i < x  2er1 ;
:
0 otherwise:

2e
Ð1i
c

x
2er1

ðNx  cÞg1 ðxÞdx þ

r
2e
Ð1

2e1i

ðNx  cÞg3 ðxÞdx.

x
2er1

N2

¼ g3 ðxÞ;
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If e1i <

c
2
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 er1 , then g ðxÞ is the same as in case (4). However, e2 ¼ 0 for
r


 2eR1
x  2e1i < c. Hence E V2r jer1 ; e1i ¼ ðNx  cÞg3 ðxÞdx.
c

Combining the expected reputational payoff and expected Stage 2 payoff to
developer i and after some extensive algebra, the marginal benefit from design


@E ðS;er1 ;e1i Þ
@EðV2r jer1 ;e1i Þ
; is:
þ
effort,
@e1i
@e1i
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<

N1 S
N er1

N1 S
> N er1

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:

e1i
er1

er1 2
e1i

N2

þ2

þ2
N2
Nþ1

N1 S
N er1

N1 S
N er1

e1i
er1

N2
Nþ1

1

1

c
2e1i

er1 2
e1i

N2

c
2e1i
2

if e1i < er1 and e1i < c2 ;
2

c
2er1

þ N þ ðN  2Þ

N1 S
N er1

er1 2
e1i

N1

e1i
2N
þ Nþ1
er1

N1
N1
þ N 1  Nþ1
c
2er1

c
2e1i

2

N1

er1 2
e1i

if er1 <

c
2

c
2

if


if

 e1i < er1 ;
c
2

 er1  e1i ;

 e1i ;

if er1  e1i < c2 :

Now suppose c > 2 In this case, er1 < c2 and e1i < c2. Then, from the design effort
provided by the developers, there is no Stage 2 payoff and the only benefit is the
reputational benefit. Here developer i’s best response is to choose e1i  er1 .
S
N1
r
Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium, er1 ¼ N1
N c if max 2; N S < c and e1 ¼ 1 if
r
N2
2 < c  N1
N S. Under our assumption that B > N S, in every case, the value
from design effort in equilibrium is positive. Since the threshold c is never met in
Stage 2, commercialization is never undertaken and er2 ¼ 0.
If c < 2, then er1  c2 in a symmetric equilibrium. This is because if er1 < c2 for
all jÞi, then i’s best response is e1i  c2 which cannot be part of a symmetric
equilibrium. Hence er1  c2 and e1i  c2. The marginal benefit in a symmetric

Nþ1
S
N2
c
2N
equilibrium is then N1
þ
2

1
þ
Nþ1
N er1
2er1
Nþ1 . It can be checked that,
h
i
cNþ1
N2
2N
at er1 ¼ 1, N1
> c. This means that er1 ¼ 1.
þ Nþ1
■
N S þ 2 Nþ1  1 2

Proof of Proposition 2. (a) Comparing ep1 and er1 obtained in Proposition 1 and
Lemma 2 respectively, we see that if c > cp , ep1 ¼ 0 < er1 . For c  cp , ep1 ¼ 1 > er1
p
r
N1
for N1
N S < c and e1 ¼ 1 ¼ e1 for N S  c.
(b) For D < Mc < c, er2 ðDÞ ¼ ep2 ðDÞ ¼ 0. If Mc  D < c, ep2 ðDÞ ¼ 1 > er2 ðDÞ ¼ 0.
■
And for D  c, er2 ðDÞ ¼ ep2 ðDÞ ¼ 1. Hence er2 ðDÞ  eP2 ðDÞ for all D.
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Proof of Lemma 3. a) and b) Since in Stage 2, the objective function and
decision making process is the same under a non-restrictive OSS license as a
proprietary license, ep2 ðDÞ ¼ enr
2 ð DÞ.
In Stage 1, the total value to the developer from design effort is




¼ Br  ΔB þ E S; e1i ; enr
 ce1i . Hence the marginal benefit is simply
V1nr e1i jenr
1
1
S
the marginal reputational payoff, i.e. N1
N enr
1

e1i
enr
1

N2

N1 S
if e1i < enr
1 and N enr
1

nr
enr
1  e1i : Setting e1i ¼ e1 in the symmetric equilibrium, we get if

enr
1
r

¼ 1 and if

N1
N S

< c, then

enr
1

¼

N1 S
N c.

N1
N S

2
enr
1
e1i

if

 c, then

Under our assumption that

B > ΔB þ N2
N S, the value from design effort is always positive in the symmetric
2

c
nr
N1 S
equilibrium. If N1
N S  2M , then e1 ¼ N c <
tion of "i for all i. This means that enr
2 ¼ 0.

c
2M ,

so that D <

c
M

for every realiza■

Proof of Proposition 3. (a) First comparing ep1 to enr
1 from Proposition 1 and
p
p
Lemma 3, for c > cp , ep1 ¼ 0 while, enr
>
0,
so
that
enr
1
1 > e1 . For c  c ,
p
nr
e1  e1 ¼ 1. Comparing design effort in the R and NR licenses from Lemmas 2
nr
r
r
nr
and 3, for c > 2, er1 ¼ enr
1 . For c < 2, e1  e1 ¼ 1. Hence for all c, e1  e1 .
p
nr
(b) Since e2 ðDÞ ¼ e2 ðDÞ, and the expected value of commercialization effort




nr
if and
is weakly increasing in design effort, we have E ep2 ðDÞjep1  E enr
2 ð DÞje1
p
only if ep1  enr
1 . From part (a), this occurs if and onlyif c  c . 


nr
r
nr
r
nr
(c) For c > 2, e1 ¼ e1 and e2 ðDÞ  e2 ðDÞ, hence E e2 ðDÞjenr
 E er2 ðDÞjer1 .
1


 N
2
For c  2, er1 ¼ 1 and E er2 ðDÞjer1 ¼ Prðmaxf"i g  cÞ ¼ 1  c2 . If S  2MNc
ðN1Þ,




nr
nr
Nc
r
 E er2 ðDÞjer1 . For S > N1
then enr
, enr
2 ¼ 0 so that E e2 ðDÞje1
1 ¼ e1 ¼ 1;
 nr



2
ðN1Þ S
Nc
nr
> E er2 ðDÞjer1 . Finally for 2MNc
hence, E e2 ðDÞjenr
1
ðN1Þ < S  N1, e1 ¼ N c
N
N


2
nr
c
c
¼ 1  2Me
and E enr
¼ 1  2M ðNc
. Hence,
nr
2 ð DÞje1 ¼ Pr maxf"i g  Menr
N1
ÞS
1
1
 nr

 r

nr
r
Nc
E e2 ðDÞje1  E e2 ðDÞje1 if and only if S  M ðN1Þ.
■

Proof of Proposition 4. Since cp > N  2; for c  2, we have:
V d ð RÞ  V d ð P Þ


S
2M
c
1
¼ Br þ þ
N N þ1
2M


c Nþ1
þ ð2  cÞ
1
2

Nþ1


 2M 1 

 2

c
N
þ2
1
2M
N þ1




S
2N
1
1
c
¼B þ 
ðM  N Þ þ ðN  1Þ 
1 N
N N þ1
N
M
2
r

Nþ1


;
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V d ðRÞ  V d ðNRÞ






nr
¼ ΔB þ E ðND  cÞer2  E ðMD  cÞenr
2  c 1  e1
2

ΔB þ 2

N2
Nþ1

6 8
6
6 <
¼6 >

6þ
4 > 2
1
: Nþ1 Menr
1

1

n
 Nþ1 o


þ ð2  cÞ  c 1  enr
1  c2
1 þ

c
2Menr
1

0 if S  2MNc
ðN1Þ ;

n
o
Nþ1
c
 2Menr
1  2Me
if S >
nr
1

2

1

Nc2
2M ðN1Þ ;

3
7
7
7
7
7
5

and
V d ðNRÞ  V d ðP Þ
2

n
 c Nþ1 o




2M
c
 ΔB þ c 1  enr
1  2M
Br þ NS þ Nþ1
 2M 1  2M
1

6 8
6
6 <
¼6 >
6þ
n
4 >
: 2Menr
1
1

2

c
2Menr
1

0 if S  2MNc
ðN1Þ ;

o
2
c
 Nþ1
Menr
1  2Me
nr
1

Nþ1



1

if S >

Nc2
2M ðN1Þ ;

3
7
7
7
7
7
5

where enr
1 ¼ min
For S 
Nc2
2M ðN1Þ

<S

N1
Nc S; 1 .
 d

Nc2
V ðRÞ  V d ðNRÞ is
2M ðN1Þ,
Nc
ðN1Þ, it is concave in S and for S

linearly increasing in S. For
>

Nc
ðN1Þ

it is constant. The maxima

is achieved at:
c
¼
2Menr
1


1
N þ 1 c Nþ1
1
;
N 2M

and


max V d ðRÞ  V d ðNRÞ

N

 2

N
c Nþ1
N þ 1 c Nþ1
þ ð2  cÞ  c 1 
¼ ΔB þ 2
:
1 1
2
N 2M
N þ1




Also, it can be checked that V d ðRÞ  V d ðNRÞ S¼0 > V d ðRÞ  V d ðNRÞ S¼ Nc .
ðN1Þ


Further, V d ðRÞ  V d ðNRÞ S¼0 is increasing in ΔB and decreasing in c and
 d

V ðRÞ  V d ðNRÞ S¼ Nc is decreasing in M, increasing in ΔB and decreasing in
ðN1Þ

^ such that:
c. Define Δ B

 2

^ ¼ max 0; 2ðc  1Þ  2 N  1 1  c
ΔB
2
N þ1

Nþ1


:
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To reduce the number of cases to consider, we assume that c  2 and


b so that V d ðRÞ  V d ðNRÞ
ΔB  Δ B
 0.
 S¼0

b 1 so that V d ðRÞ  V d ðNRÞ
Further, define M
¼ 0. Hence, for all
Nc b
S¼ðN1
;M 1
Þ
b 1 ; we have.V d ðRÞ  V d ðNRÞ: Now consider the case where ΔB  Δ B
b and
MM
Nc2
Nc
b 1 : Define bs1 2
M>M
2M ðN1Þ ; ðN1Þ such that:
n
2
3
 Nþ1 o
 Nþ1
N2
þ 2 c2
1  c2
þ cb
e1nr
ΔB  c þ 2 Nþ1
6
7
(

Nþ1 )
6
7 ¼ 0;
4
5
2
nr
c
 Nþ1 M b
e1 N þ
e1nr
2M b

bS2
d
d
where b
e1nr ¼ N1
N c : Hence, under our assumptions, V ðNRÞ > V ð RÞ if and only if
b 1 and S > b
M>M
S1 ; otherwise we have V d ðRÞ  V d ðNRÞ:
Define




2N 2
1
1
c
b
1 N
ðM  N Þ þ ðN  1Þ 
S2 ¼ max 0;
N
M
2
N þ1

Nþ1




 NB :
r

b 1;
Hence, V d ðRÞ  V d ðP Þ if and only if S  b
S2 : Note that, in addition, if M  M
d
d
then V ðRÞ  V ðNRÞ and hence R is chosen.
b 1 . Define b
Now suppose M > M
S3 such that for all nS  b
So
3 ; we have
22
d
d
V ðNRÞ  V ðP Þ. Then P is chosen if and only if S < min b
S2 ; b
S3 : It is easy
S3  b
S1 ; or
to check that there exist only two possibilities – either b
S2  b
b
S3 < b
S2 : In the latter case, R is never chosen; P is chosen if S < b
S3 and NR
S1 < b
b
b
is chosen
h
iif S  S3 In the earlier case, P is chosen if S < S2 ; R is chosen if
b
b
b
S 2 S2 ; S1 and NR is chosen if S > S1 :
^ 1 ; suppose ^
For M  M
S3 ! 1: Combining the analysis above, we can sumn
o
S3 ; NR is chosen if and only if
marize that P is chosen if and only if S < min b
S2 ; b
n
o
■
S3 ; in all other cases, R is chosen.
S  max b
S1 ; b

22 To find b
S3 ; one can find all the roots of the following equation and the highest value root
gives b
S3 :
8
2
3
!Nþ1 9


<
=
x
N 1
2M
c
5

c
þ min
x; 1 4
Nþ
;
N
Nc
N þ1:
2M min N1
Nc x; 1


2M
c Nþ1
¼
Nþ
 ðBr  ΔBÞ  c:
N þ1
2M

If there does not exist any root of the equation above, then ^S3 ¼ 0:
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Proof of Proposition 5. a) It can be checked that the relationship between
V o ðP Þ, V o ðRÞ and V o ðNRÞ with respect to S, ΔB, c and M is the same as the
relationship between V d ðP Þ, V d ðRÞ and V d ðNRÞ.




½V o ðRÞ  V o ðP Þ ¼ N V d ðRÞ  V d ðP Þ þ NE ððM  N ÞD  cÞer2 , which is
 d

increasing in S as with V ðRÞ  V d ðP Þ .




½V o ðRÞ  V o ðNRÞ ¼ N V d ðRÞ  V d ðNRÞ þ NE ððM  N ÞD  cÞer2 has the
 d

same properties with respect to S, ΔB, c and M as V ðRÞ  V d ðNRÞ .


Finally, ½V o ðNRÞ  V o ðP Þ ¼ N V d ðNRÞ  V d ðP Þ which is also increasing in S.


^ so that V d ðRÞ  V d ðNRÞ
Further, under our restriction ΔB  ΔB
 0; we
S¼0
o
o
have ½V ðRÞ  V ðNRÞS¼0  0 as well. Thus the choice between efficient
licenses is qualitatively identical to the equilibrium choice between licenses.
However, the cutoff levels of S and M that define the efficient license differ from
the cutoffs in equilibrium.
b) Since V o ðRÞ > NV d ðRÞ, for every parameterization where the developers
are indifferent between R and NR or P, the social planner strictly prefers R over
NR or P. In other words, if V d ðRÞ ¼ V d ðNRÞ; then V o ðRÞ > V o ðNRÞ. Similarly, if
V d ðRÞ ¼ V d ðP Þ; then V o ðRÞ > V o ðP Þ. Thus the range of S and M where the
market chooses R is necessarily smaller than the range of parameters where
the social planner chooses R.
■
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